Title Contract-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Device-to-Device Communications in Cellular Networks
Authors Zhang, Yanru
Song, Lingyang
Saad, Walid
Dawy, Zaher
Han, Zhu
Affiliation Univ Houston, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Houston, TX 77004 USA.
Peking Univ, Sch Elect Engn & Comp Sci, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China.
Virginia Tech, Bradley Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Wireless VT, Blacksburg, VA 24061 USA.
Amer Univ Beirut, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Beirut 11072020, Lebanon.
Virginia Tech, Bradley Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Blacksburg, VA 24061 USA.
Keywords Contract theory
D2D communication
incentive mechanism
COLLABORATION
AUCTION
Issue Date 2015
Publisher IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS
Citation IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS.2015,33,(10),2144-2155.
Abstract Device-to-device (D2D) communication is viewed as one promising technology for boosting the capacity of wireless networks and the efficiency of resource management. D2D communication heavily depends on the participation of users in sharing contents. Thus, it is imperative to introduce new incentive mechanisms to motivate such user involvement. In this paper, a contract-theoretic approach is proposed to solve the problem of providing incentives for D2D communication in cellular networks. First, using the framework of contract theory, the users' preferences toward D2D communication are classified into a finite number of types, and the service trading between the base station and users is properly modeled. Next, necessary and sufficient conditions are derived to provide incentives for users' engagement in D2D communication. Finally, our analysis is extended to the case in which there is a continuum of users. Simulation results show that the contract can effectively incentivize users' participation, and increase capacity of the cellular network than the other mechanisms.
URI http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/415990
ISSN 0733-8716
DOI 10.1109/JSAC.2015.2435356
Indexed SCI(E)
EI
Appears in Collections: 信息科学技术学院

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